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THE ARCHITECTURE OF HEALTH CARE
MARKETS: ECONOMIC SOCIOLOGY AND
ANTITRUST LAW
Peter J. Hammer, J.D., Ph.D.*

I.

INTRODUCTION

Why an economic sociology of health care markets? Surprisingly, while neoclassical economics has well-developed models of
competition, it has a fairly impoverished understanding of markets.
If economists treat "the firm" as a black box, the same is equally true
of "the market." The absence of a theory is not a serious concern in
markets that function well. The absence of such a theory in health
care, however, is a problem. Health care markets are not well-functioning. 1 Health care is plagued with substantial market failures.
Similarly, health care markets defy simple or clear distinctions between what is "public" and what is "private." 2 Without a better theory of health care markets and how public and private elements
interact, judges will be constrained in their ability to formulate
workable antitrust policy, and legislators will be constrained in their
ability to formulate a more rational competition policy.
Much of my past work has sought answers to these questions
3
looking, as an economist and antitrust lawyer, from the inside out.
This essay is an effort to examine health care markets from the
outside in, through the lens of economic sociology, rather than
traditional economic theory. The principal aid in this process will be
Neil Fligstein's book, The Architecture of Markets: An Economic Sociology of Twenty-First-Century CapitalistSocieties.4 The analysis will proProfessor of Law, Wayne State University Law School
1 Peter J. Hammer, Arrow's Analysis of Social Institutions: Entering the Marketplace with Giving

Hands?, 26 J. HEALTH POL. POL'Y & L. 1081, 1083 (2001).
2 Id.at 1090.
3 See, e.g., id. at 1084.
4 NEIL FLIGsTEIN, THE ARCHITECTURE OF MARKETS: AN ECONOMIC SOCIOLOGY OF TWENTY-

FIRST-CENTURY CAPITALIST SOCIETIES (2001). Fligstein observes that "[miost economists ignore, or are unaware of, how noneconomists think about economic processes." Id. at 8.
This was certainly true of my own graduate training. So what is an economic sociology of
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ceed as follows: Drawing upon Fligstein's insights, Part II highlights
four general fallacies of neoclassical economic understandings of
markets (fallacies, at least, from a sociological perspective). Part III
uses the tools of economic sociology to construct an architecture of
health care markets. Part IV tentatively considers the implications of
the foregoing on three issues that are significant to the future of
medical antitrust law: What are the implications for efforts to construct a competition policy in health care? What are the implications
for efforts to better cultivate dynamic efficiency? Finally, what are
the implications of economic sociology for the antitrust state action
immunity doctrine, the principal tool courts use to police the
boundary of the public and private sides of economic markets?

II.

A

SOCIOLOGICAL VIEW OF ECONOMIC MARKETS

It is not surprising that competing academic disciplines will
view the same phenomena from different standpoints. Sociologists
have a very different understanding than neoclassical economists
about how we should think about markets.5 Four critiques of standard economic theory can be distilled from a sociological perspective. These critiques are characterized as "fallacies" (my label, not
Fligstein's) to highlight the tensions between an economic and a sociological approach.

markets? Broadly speaking, Fligstein uses "five theoretical questions to define the terrain
of a sociology of markets in modem societies." Id. at 10.
1. "What social rules must exist for markets to function, and what types of social
structures are necessary to produce stable markets?" Id.
2. "What is the relation between states and firms in the production of markets?"
Id. at 11.
3. "What is the 'social' view of what actors seek to do in markets, as opposed to
an 'economic' one?" Id. at 13.
4. "What are the dynamics by which markets are created, attain stability and are
transformed, and how can we characterize the relations among markets?" Id. at
14.
5. 'What are the implications of market dynamics for the internal structuring of
firms and labor markets more generally?" Id.
For an interesting illustration of the different perspectives of economists and sociologists,
compare Mark C. Suchman, Translation Costs: A Comment on Sociology and Economics, 74
OR. L. REV. 257 (1995) with Lisa Bernstein, The Silicon Valley Lawyer as Transaction Cost
Engineer?, 74 OR. L. REV. 239 (1995). See also Kenneth G. Dau-Schmidt, Economics and Sociology: The Prospectsfor an InterdisciplinaryDiscourse on Law, 1997 Wis. L. REV. 389 (1997).
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Economic Fallacy One: Markets are Free-Standing Entities

In neoclassical economic models, markets are undefined meeting places where private buyers transact with private sellers. 6 There
is no express role for the state. 7 Indeed, from an economic perspective, the state that governs best, governs least, while staying in the
8
background and assuming at most an implicit traffic cop function.
From a sociological perspective, in contrast, the market is a richly
textured social institution embedded in other overlapping social institutions. 9 In this setting, there is no clear delineation between
"public" and "private." The roles of public and private actors are
intertwined and interconnected. 10 The intuition behind a sociological perspective can best be grasped by thinking about the evolution
of markets and capitalism. Historically, it is impossible to separate

the function of "market building" in modem western countries from
the process of "state building."1 The state played a critical role at
the inception of markets.12 The state continues to define and redefine property rights, governance structures, and the rules of exchange.1 3 Moreover, the state referees ongoing disputes between
market stakeholders and stands ready to intervene at times of eco6 FLIGSTEIN, supra note 4, at 11-12:
The model for perfectly competitive markets is a bazaar, a place where individual buyers and sellers meet to trade. The reality is, of course, more complex.
Modem production markets require, at the very least, investment in physical
plant; the building of organizations; legal, social, and physical infrastructures
(i.e., forms of transportation, finance, and communication); complex chains of
supply; labor markets and the training of skilled personnel; regulation of fair and
unfair competition; and methods to enforce contracts. Neoconservative theorists
can do a thought experiment in which private agencies provide all of these services. Historically, however, governments have been involved in providing these
market-building services and structures.
(citation omitted).
7 Id.at 12.
8 Id.at 12-13.
9 Economic sociology has more in common with the new institutional economics than neoclassical economics. For useful surveys of modem institutional economics, see generally
DOUGLASS C. NORTH, UNDERSTANDING THE PROCESS OF ECONOMIC CHANGE (2005);
THRAINN EGGERTSSON, ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR AND INSTITUTIONS (1990); and Oliver E. Williamson, The New Institutional Economics: Taking Stock, Looking Ahead, 38 J. EcON. LIT. 595
(2000). This article will limit itself to contrasting economic sociology with the neoclassical
school of economics.
10FLIGSTEIN, supra note 4, at 11-14.

11See generally JERRY

Z. MULLER, THE MIND AND THE MARKET: CAPITALISM IN MODERN EURO-

PEAN THOUGHT (2002); and MICHEL BEAUD, A HISTORY OF CAPITALISM: 1500-2000 (2000).

12See generally MULLER, supra note 11.
13See generally FLIGSTEIN, supra note 4.
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nomic and social crisis. 14 In short, there is no market without the
state.
Recognizing the state's role in markets is only the starting
point of the analysis. Important questions remain. What exactly is a
market? What is the role of the state? How are the roles of the market and the state interconnected? While markets vary tremendously,
all markets have a basic underlying infrastructure: "[Slocieties have
general rules, both formal and informal, about organizing economic
activities. These rules provide the social conditions for economic exchange and allow for the production of new markets. Markets need
definitions of property rights, governance structures, and rules of
exchange.' 5 Sociologists, lawyers, and economists have differing
understandings of each of these concepts. For example, for Fligstein,
"[piroperty rights are rules that define who has claims on the profits
of firms (akin to what agency theorists call 'residual claims' on the
free cash flow of firms).1 16 The delineation of these rights is a political, not an economic or a legal process. "The construction of property rights is a continuous and contestable political process, not the
outcome of an efficient process... Organized groups from business,
labor, government agencies, and political parties try to affect the
constitution of property rights. '17 In addition to property rights,
markets require a governance structure and rules of exchange.
"Governance structures refer to general rules in a society that define
relations of competition and cooperation and define how the firms
should be organized."'18 "Rules of exchange define who can transact
with whom and the conditions under which transactions are carried
out." 19

The state-market interface may change by economic sector and
over time. Sometimes the state plays a passive role, simply ratifying
or providing legitimacy to rules of private origin. At other times,

14Id. at 19.
15

Id. at 11.
at 33.

16 Id.
17

1d.

18FLIGSTEIN, supra note 4, at 34.
19Id.
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state intervention may be direct. 20 To understand the relationship
21
between markets and the state, Fligstein invokes "field theory.
The theory of fields assumes that actors try to produce a "local"
stable world where the dominant actors produce meanings that allow them to reproduce their advantage. These actors create status
hierarchies that define the positions of incumbents and challengers.
Actors face two related problems when constructing these fields:
attaining a stable system of power and then maintaining it. The social organization of fields broadly refers to three features: the set of
principles that organize thought and are used by actors to make
sense of their situations (what might be called cognitive frames or
world views), the routines or practices that actors perform in their
day-to-day social relations, and the social relations that constitute
22
fields that may or may not be consciously understood by actors.
Both the state and the market can be understood as "fields." In
his seminal 1937 article The Nature of the Firm, Coase argued that the
central planning of the regulatory state was theoretically the same
problem faced by individual "firms" in a capitalist economy - allo23
cating scarce resources in the absence of a price mechanism.
Though using different tools and perspectives, Fligstein argues for a
similar symmetry in understanding the processes generating and
sustaining both states and markets. We begin with the state.
State building can be viewed as the historical process by which
groups outside of the state are able to get domains organized by the
state to make rules for some set of societal fields. These rules reflect
the interests of the most powerful groups in various fields. Politically oriented social movements are, by definition, outside of some
established field of a given state. They are oriented toward either
creating a new domain where they will have power, or taking over
and transforming an existing domain or even the entire state. At
any given moment, there are political projects in the fields that
make up states (i.e., "normal politics") and social movements
ori24
ented toward altering incumbents' ability to set rules.

Markets can also be understood as "fields."
20FLIGSTEIN, supra note 4, at 19:

If producing stability in multiple markets requires rules, then governments are
deeply implicated in defining the various social structures that stabilize markets.
At the very least, governments have to ratify firms' abilities to use various structures that mediate competition and conflict ...At the very most, they directly
intervene in market processes to produce stability.
21"The key insight of the approach is to consider that social action takes place in arenas,
what may be called fields, domains, sectors, or organized social spaces ...Fields contain collective actors who try to produce a system of domination in that space. To do so requires the
production of a local culture that defines local social relations between actors." Id. at 15.
22Id. at 29 (references omitted).
23Ronald Coase, The Nature of the Firm, 4 ECONOMICA 386, 389 n.3 (1937).
24 FLIGSTEIN, supra note 4, at 16 (citation omitted).
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Using the idea of markets as fields requires one to specify what a
market is, who the players are, what it means to be an incumbent
and a challenger, and how the social relationships and cultural understandings that come into play create stable fields by solving the
main problem of competition and controlling uncertainty. 5
The sociologist's definition of a market follows from the field
analysis. Fligstein writes: "I accept the view that a market is a 'selfreproducing role structure of producers.' A stable 'market as a field'
means that the main players in a given market are able to reproduce
their firms." 26 Economic reproduction requires the ability to anticipate and strategically respond to the actions of other market participants: "Local market orders refer to a set of firms that take one
another into account in their actions and, in so doing, are able to
reproduce themselves on a period-to-period basis. All markets,
whether organized in a city, a region, or across societies, can be ana'27
lyzed from this perspective.
The sociological perspective provides a number of insights into
the dynamics of state-market relations. To begin with, state-market
relations are governed by a dominant template that broadly defines
the nature of state-market interaction across sectors.
Market orders are governed by a general set of rules. These rules
are the common understandings and laws that allow capitalist

firms to exist. General ideas of market orders are embedded within
a particular society and a government and reflect the society's par-

ticular history. The dominance of different groups in society means
that those rules tend to reflect one set of interests over another. 28

Neither the market nor the state are static fields. Evolution of
state-market relations takes place, but this evolution is highly path
dependent. "As forms of fields created by states to intervene in markets respond to and reshape the fields that are markets, state building and market building go hand in hand. Once institutionalized,
these rules both enable and constrain subsequent behavior." 29 While
general social rules are important, so are local rules and
understandings.
Markets produce local cultures that define who is an incumbent
and who is a challenger and why (i.e., they define the social structure). They prescribe how competition will work in a given market.
They also provide actors with cognitive frames to interpret the ac25Id. at 17.
26Id. (quoting Harrison C. White, Where do Markets Come From?, 87 AM. J. OF Soc. 517 (1981)).
27

Id. at 16.

28Id.
29FLIGSTEIN, supra note 4, at 19.
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I have called these local understandtions of other organizations.
30
ings conceptions of control.

Understanding these local conceptions of control is essential to
understanding the operations and potential evolution of particular
markets. "Conceptions of control reflect market-specific agreements
between actors in firms on principles of internal organization (i.e.,
forms of hierarchy) tactics for competition and cooperation (i.e.,
strategies) and the hierarchy or status ordering of firms in a given
market. '31 Conceptions of control implicitly challenge the economist's view of the rational actor. These conceptions necessarily influence how actors interpret their environment. "A conception of
control is simultaneously a worldview that allows actors to interpret
the actions of others and a reflection of how the market is structured. '32 These conceptualizations will have important implications
for how a market will evolve over time and respond to exogenous
changes. "Actors are also cognitively constrained by a conception of
control. Their analysis of a crisis is framed by the current conception
of control and their attempts to alleviate the crisis by applying 'the
conventional wisdom." 33 This introduces both an essential conservatism as well as a form of cognitive path dependence to the dynamics
of market evolution. "Firms in stable markets continue to use the
governing conception of control, even when confronted with
outside invasion or general economic crisis." 34 Understanding market evolution, therefore, requires not only an understanding of the
given market's conception of control, but also how those concepts
change over time, i.e., a theory of market learning.
B.

Economic Fallacy Two: The Firm is the Proper Unit of
Analysis

Neoclassical economists focus on the firm as the proper unit of
analysis. Firms compete with other firms. Firms engage in serial
transactions with consumers. Firms produce, while consumers consume. There is no doubt that firms are important actors and that
their conduct is relevant to market analysis. The sociological perspective, however, counsels against viewing firms in isolation and
focusing on their actions to the exclusion of others. Markets are
30Id. at 18 (citing NEIL FLIGSTEIN, THE TRANSFORMATION OF CORPORATE CONTROL (1990)).
31Id. at 35.
32 Id.

33Id.at 82.
34FLIGSTEIN, supra note 4, at 81.
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fields. These fields consist of dense and overlapping networks of
social interaction. Firm-customer relations constitute only part of
the picture. "[T]here are actual relationships among producers, customers, suppliers, and governments in a given market. '35 Stabilizing
these multiple, overlapping relations is a significant aspect of market interaction.
A firm's product mix and marketing strategies, organizational
forms, and relationships with competitors, suppliers, customers,
and the government are structured by its attempts to mitigate the
possible negative effects of competition and internal political conflict. Social structures in markets and within firms emerge to help
firms cope 36with competition and stabilize their various
relationships.
These social networks stretch both externally from the firm to
other market participants, as well as internally within the firm. "The
theory of fields implies that the search for stable interaction with
competitors, suppliers, and workers is the main cause of social
structures in markets." 37 The theme is intercornectivity. "The imagery," according to Fligstein, is "of markets as fields and of fields
as connected to and part of governments. '38 In contrast, economists
view firms as both independent and isolated entities.
Networks suggest not only interconnections, but also hierarchies. In these networks, not all firms are equal. There are incumbent firms and challenger firms, and they can be expected to behave
differently from each other.
Incumbent firms are those that dominate a particular market by
creating stable relations with other producers, important suppliers,

customers, and the government. They exploit their position of domination by reacting to what other dominant firms are doing. Challenger firms fit into the dominant logic of a stable market, either by
findinA a spot in the market (i.e., niche) or imitating dominant
firms.
A focus on markets as fields and on fields as relational networks introduces an unavoidable political aspect to the analysis.
"Once in place, the interactions in fields become 'games' where
groups in the field who have more power use the acceptable cultural rules to reproduce their power. This process makes action in
the field continuously conflictual and inherently political." 40 Exactly
35Id. at 10.
36Id. at 17.

37Id. at 18.
38Id. at 90.
39FLIGSTEIN, supra note 4, at 17.
40Id. at 15.
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what the objectives of these games are is the subject of the next
fallacy.
C.

Economic Fallacy Three: Firms Maximize Profits and

Competition Yields Efficiency
In economic models, the behavioral assumptions are fairly
straightforward. Consumers act consistently to maximize utility and
firms act consistently to maximize profits. Economic sociology radically redefines the firm's objective function. From the sociological
perspective, the firm's primary goal is seeking and maintaining stability. "Much of the market-making project is to find ways to stabilize and routinize competition." 41 As such, firms seek stability and
try to avoid sources of instability.
The sociology of markets that I am developing replaces profit-maximizing actors with people who are trying to promote the survival
of their firm. There are four threats to a firm's survival. First, suppliers can control inputs, raise prices, and make firms who require
their inputs unprofitable. Second, competitors can engage in price
competition, take over market share, and eventually drive the firm
out of business. Third, gaining cooperation from managers and
workers in the firm presents problems of interpersonal conflict and
and serpolitics that can jeopardize the ability to produce goods
42
vices as well. Finally, products may become obsolete.

As noted, competition, particularly price competition, is inherently destabilizing. 43 Since competition is a source of instability, it
needs to be managed and controlled.
The goal for dominant firms is to provide a set of understandings
for themselves about how to cope with this potential destabilization. Firms frame their behavior, vis-A-vis one another, with the
goals of convincing incumbent firms not to directly challenge one
another and of ensuring 44that challenger firms decide not to compete directly over prices.

The resulting stability (equilibrium) is very different from that
of the neoclassical economic model. "When successful, actors produce social relationships that have the effect of creating stable markets, that is, situations where incumbent firms who take one another
into account in their behavior are able to reproduce themselves on a
41Id. at 5.
42Id. at 17.
43Id. at 68 ("The basic idea is that the price mechanism in a given market (i.e., the balance of
supply and demand) tends to destabilize all firms in a market. This is because it encourages all firms to undercut the prices of other firms, and this threatens the financial stability
of firms.").
44FLIGSTEIN, supra note 4, at 69.
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period-to-period basis. '45 "Stable markets can be described as 'self
reproducing role structures' in which incumbent and challenger
46
firms reproduce their positions on a period-of-period basis."
If this is true, then the resulting point of stable firm reproduction (equilibrium) will not be one that likely coincides with the competitive equilibrium. This observation necessarily calls into question
the normative underpinnings of the economic model.
A number of normative outcomes are implied by this analysis.
First, if firms are effective and not efficient, then the claim that one
form of market organization is superior to other forms is probably
false. If firms survive by stabilizing their relationships with their
competition, then the social relations that are the outcome of this
process are not maximizing the efficient allocation of resources for
society. Society is prepared to allow individuals to reap profits by
finding legal ways to stabilize social relations in markets because
there is a general good being served (i.e., the reliable
production of
47
goods and services and the offer of employment).

If the equilibrium is not competitive, there is no reason to believe that market competition will yield an efficient allocation of
resources.
D.

Economic Fallacy Four: Firms are Stable, Unitary Actors

This last fallacy is a corollary of the second. From a sociological
perspective, overlapping networks, not firms, are the proper units
of analysis. This is true for internal as well as external relations.
Two related sets of social relations, what can be called "control
projects," are implicated in market building. First, a firm's internal
power struggle must be resolved. The internal power struggle is
about who controls the organization, how it is organized, and how
ongoing situations in the product market are analyzed. Second, actors in incumbent and challenger firms must recognize
the social
48
stabilizing effects of current relations between firms.

Firms themselves constitute an inherently contestable social
and economic space. The continued existence and internal composition of firms cannot be taken for granted. "Issues of internal organi-

zation revolve around producing stable (reproducible) social
relations. The intra-organizational power struggle is about actors

within the organization making claims to solve the 'critical' organi45

Id. at 18.

46 Id. at

31.

47Id. at 22.
48Id. at 69 (citing HARRISON C. WHITE, IDENTITY AND CONTROL: A STRUCTURAL THEORY OF

SOCIAL ACTION (1992)).
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zational problems." 49 The solution to this problem is intertwined
with the construction of functional local cultures and conceptions of
control discussed earlier.
The winners of the internal power struggle are those with a compelling vision of how to make the firm work internally and how to
interact with the firm's main competitors. I introduced the idea of a
"conception of control" to summarize this worldview and the real
social relations that exist between firms. In this way, a conception
of control is a story about what the organization is and its location
frame
vis-A-vis its principal competitors. It is also an interpretive
used to interpret and justify actions vis-A-vis others 50
These insights stand in contrast with the traditional economic

view (or non-theory) of the firm as a black box. From a sociological
perspective, intra-firm dynamics are significant. Among other
things, these dynamics are potential sources of instability. A firm's
relationship with and between its managers, and with and between
its workers, is critical and changes over time. The firm itself is a
shifting composite of these forces. Its internal relations are just as
important and potentially contestable as its external relations.

III.

THE ARCHITECTURE OF HEALTH CARE MARKETS

What is the relevance of economic sociology to health care?
Health care markets illustrate many of the lessons of economic sociology. Moreover, economic sociology can lead to a deeper understanding of health care. This section sketches with broad strokes the
architecture of health care markets. From a historical perspective,
the story of American health care is a story of physician dominance.
A century of physician control in public and private domains has
deeply embedded a set of governing templates and conceptions of
control for health care relations. But, instability, not stability, has

been the central characteristic of health care for the past four decades. The uncertainty that surrounds contemporary health care
markets can be modeled as a series of challenges progressively er-

oding the tradition of physician dominance, in conjunction with the
complete failure of physicians and others to establish new conceptions of control that have social and economic legitimacy in a world
preoccupied with controlling costs. We begin with the general lessons for health care from economic sociology. We will then examine
the tradition of physician dominance and the erosion of that
tradition.
49FLIGSTEIN, supra note 4, at 71 (citation ommitted).
50Id. at 69.
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Health Care and the Lessons of Economic Sociology

Fligstein focuses on economic markets generally, and not the
particularities of health care. 51 Still, even a cursory examination of
health care markets illustrates many of the above lessons. The
state's involvement in medical markets is clearer than most sectors.
The state licenses physicians, regulates the sale of health insurance,
and constrains the types of corporate forms that are permissible.
Medicare, Medicaid, and the State Child Health Insurance Program
(SCHIP) account for more than one-third of all national health care
spending. 52 Common law courts interpret insurance contracts and
police medical malpractice. The FDA regulates the sales of
pharmaceuticals and certain medical devices. 53 Public involvement
is everywhere. Health care markets are not the private, autonomous,
free-standing domains of the neoclassical economic model.
Other lessons of economic sociology are also illustrated. Health
care is not characterized by a set of simple firms producing health
care services and selling their wares to consumers in discrete, binary
transactions. People do not think about their "transactions" with
their doctors. They talk about their "relationship" with their doctor.
There is very little price shopping or price competition in these relationships. Not even individual consumers can be viewed in isolation. Few consumers are direct purchasers of the health care services
they consume. Consumers are either parts of larger (public or private) insurance pools, or stand largely outside the market amongst
the ranks of the uninsured. Likewise, physicians and hospitals are
members of a range of groups and professional associations, from
county and state medical societies, to specialty boards of physicians,
to national hospital associations, and the Joint Commission on Accreditation of Health Care Organizations (JCAHO). These groups
serve personal, professional, collective economic, self-regulatory,
and surrogate public functions. JCAHO certification of hospitals, for
example, substitutes for independent Medicare assessments of
eligibility.54
51See generally FLIGSTEIN, supra note 4.
52 CENTER FOR MEDICARE

AND

MEDICAID SERVICES,

PROGRAM INFORMATION

ON MEDICARE,

SCHIP AND OTHER PROGRAMS OF THE CENTER FOR MEDICARE AND MEDICAID SERVICES, § 1, 6 (June 2002), http://www.cms.hhs.gov/TheChartSeries/Downloads/Secl-p.

MEDICAID,

pdf.
53

FEDERAL FOOD, DRUG, AND COSMETIC ACT,

54 American

21 U.S.C. §§ 351 to 360ccc-2 (2004).

Society for Healthcare Engineering of the American Hospital Association,
ICAHO Federal Deemed Status and State Recognition, at http://www.ashe.org/ashe/codes/
jcaho/deemed-status.hmtl (last visited Sept. 20, 2007).
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Social networks of professional organizations overlap and
work with (and against) each other. In these overlapping networks,
individual actors are often called upon to play multiple roles. Physicians, for example, are self-interested sellers of medical services and,
at the same time, expected to be faithful agents for their consuming
patients. Whether and how these roles conflict often depends on the
overriding scheme of reimbursement. Under traditional fee-for-service systems of compensation, physician and patient interests were
aligned in the same direction. In contrast, under modem systems of
managed care, where a physician may be a partial equity owner of
the enterprise, the financial interests of physicians and patients can
be in direct opposition. In a different context, physicians may either
be individual competitors or colleagues on a hospital's medical staff
deciding upon the competence or staff privileges of their economic
rivals. Understanding health care markets, therefore, requires understanding these multiple interlocking networks and how these
competing and complementary roles interact. A focus on individual
actors or isolated "firms" is not sufficient.
Health care markets contain other puzzles. Is the behavior of
physicians and hospitals best characterized as profit maximization,
or the quest for stability in the form of period-to-period reproduction?5 5 Viewed from an empirical perspective, the case for rational
profit maximization is not obvious. I have argued elsewhere that
business practices in the managed care industry are more consistent
with patterns of "herding and cycling" than efficient evolution and
rational adaptation. 56 In a turbulent environment, however, it may
be difficult to differentiate competing theories of behavior. Resisting
change or cooperating to reproduce old power relations in new
forms may descriptively be consistent with incumbents either seeking stability or maximizing profits. Survival in an uncertain environment is itself a rational strategy.
In this confused and uncertain environment, the themes of economic sociology have an intuitive appeal. But what does the architecture of contemporary health care markets look like? In the world
of social institutions, past is often prologue. To understand the architecture of modern health care markets, one must start with un55The question of physician profit maximization and the role of non-profit hospitals has
long challenged economists and sociologists. See Kenneth J. Arrow, Uncertainty and the
Welfare Economics of Medical Care, 53 AM. ECON. REV. 941 (1963).
56

See Peter J. Hammer, Competition and Quality as Dynamic Processes in the Balkans of American
Health Care, 31 J. HEALTH POL. POL'Y & L. 473, 485-88 (2006). We will return to this puzzle
infra Part III.C.2.

240

Hous. J.

HEALTH

L. &

POL'Y

derstanding the central role traditionally played by physicians. This
sets the dominant template for state-market relations. It also establishes the point of departure for the subsequent path-dependent
evolution of medical markets. The story of modern American health
care is one of progressive change. The analysis must therefore examine the forces that have challenged physician dominance and
consider how physicians have responded to these threats. But the
architecture of health care markets is not only institutional, it is also
cognitive. "Conceptions of control" provide the frames through
which actors understand their environment and their relations to
others-old and new. New institutions may replace traditional
structures, but they will be at best only partially successful unless
they also generate workable and persuasive conceptions of control.
B.

The Traditional Power and Dominance of Physicians

Historically, one cannot think about the architecture of American health care markets without acknowledging the physician's central role. The "professions" are often extended a special type of
"property right" in their labor, one ostensibly born of expertise and
protected through state-sanctioned credentialing.5 7 Illustrating again
the close relationship between the market and the state, the state
legitimizes the credential and enforces the license's monopolistic
value by making it the exclusive basis of market entry. What the
state does less in the professional domain than in other economic
realms is engage in substantive control of the trade. This oversight is
ceded to the profession itself in the form of self-regulation, further
mixing public and private roles.58
Workers can capture domains as well. Groups of workers may, for
example, win the right to certify new workers, which in essence
gives them the right to decide who has a "property right," who
owns a certificate that entitles them to make a profit from their
skill. The government may directly intervene in this process or allow certification boards to be selected from members of the worker
communities. Professions, such as physicians in the United States,
7"'he power of workers and professionals has two sources: skill and status differences, and
the ability to control the supply of labor and skills." FLIGSTEIN, supra note 4, at 103-04.
58Id. at 106:
Professional systems that rely on private associations for credentialing tend to
have more autonomy from state and corporate actors. Here, boards of experts
credential new professionals either through exam systems or by governing training programs. Such systems rely on governments, of course, to legitimate their
right for a monopoly over the credentialing process. But they maintain their autonomy by declaring that they are the only ones with sufficient knowledge to
certify other professionals.
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have used this tactic successfully
for long periods of time to control
59
the supply of doctors.
Here, it is useful to recall two earlier points. First, the template
of initial state intervention typically serves as the template for future
state interventions. "Initial formation of policy domains and the
rules they create affecting property rights, governance structures,
and rules of exchange shape the development of new markets because they produce cultural templates that determine how to organize in a given society." 60 This introduces a strong conservative
tendency as to how markets evolve and manage change. "The shape
of initial regulatory institutions has a profound effect on subsequent
capitalist development." 61 Second, state intervention is typically in
response to those who have power, the incumbent groups. "The political-cultural approach implies that the historical problems of the
instability of markets for market participants, the formation of institutions to deal with these problems, and the configuration of economic and political elites are pivotal to setting up stable markets.
Once established, they tend to reproduce entrenched interests and
structure the emergence of new markets in that society." 62 These factors seek, although not always successfully, to reinforce the stability
of the existing regime, even as state-market relations respond in an
evolutionary manner to a changing environment over time.
Policy domains in American health care are numerous, hierarchical, and complex. In addition to noting the strength of traditional
physician dominance, it is necessary to realize the relatively circumscribed scope of the domains in which physicians exercised public
power. The site of the traditional state-market interface in health
care was at the state not the federal level. Moreover, the scope of
physician control was relatively narrow, relating to questions that
coincided with areas of their professional expertise-issues of licensing, evaluating the quality of care, and overseeing the system of
medical education. 63 Within these domains, physician authority was
59 Id. at 43 (citing PAUL STARR, THE SOCIAL TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN MEDICINE: THE

RISE OF A SOVEREIGN PROFESSION AND THE MAKING OF A VAST INDUSTRY (1982)).
60Id. at 40.
61
Id.
62 FLIGSTEIN,

supra note 4, at 20.

63Fligstein emphasizes the role that educational systems play in preserving traditional employment status hierarchies. "At crucial points in time, power constellations in society and
differentiated patterns in education have crystallized and been 'frozen' into institutions
that have continued to shape employment systems even after those initial conditions have
changed." Id. at 109. This is particularly true in the professional setting. "Professional
projects try to use the abstract expertise of a group as a grounds for self-governance. The
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and remains quite strong, with state actors typically acquiescing to
physician claim of medical and scientific expertise. Significantly, the
erosion of physician dominance has less to do with their loss of
power in traditional policy domains than with the opening of new
policy domains, particularly at the federal level, and the implications that these new policy domains have for state-market relations.
C.

Threats to Physician Dominance

While still exercising substantial power, physicians are not the
overwhelming political force they once were. 64 Why have old professional systems of domination and conceptions of control broken
down? There is no single, or simple, answer to this question. Three
factors that are reworking the architecture of health care markets
will be examined here. These forces are government actions through
the Medicare and Medicaid programs, the changing nature of the
health care firm, and the uncertain future of employer-based health
care benefits. Understanding changes in health care financing, unrelenting developments in medical technology, and how market and
non-market institutions have responded to these forces are essential
to explaining the erosion of physician dominance and the resulting
sector instability. Two of the overriding policy concerns in health
care are (1) Who will pay for care? and (2) How will costs be controlled? The question of cost control can be broken down further
into two subcomponents: (2a) rationalizing technology (R&D, adoption, and dissemination) and (2b) rationalizing the utilization of care
at the level of the individual clinical episode. These issues are all
interconnected. Technology decisions, for example, are strongly but
only indirectly influenced by who pays for care, how it is paid for,
and how it is expected to be utilized. Together, these forces are reworking health care markets. As all working with the industry
know, however, what shape the future architecture will ultimately
take remains uncertain.
new literature on professions also notes that they employ universities in their struggle for

governance, focus their control projects on the state, and constantly try to invade other
groups' professional territory." Id. at 104. Once anchored in, change is difficult to effectu-

ate. "One can see that, once in existence, the organization of labor markets is difficult to
change. Workers, employers, governments, and those who run the education system have

a stake in the current structure." Id. at 102-03. Tellingly, Arrow also stressed the important
economic role played by medical education. See Arrow, supra note 55, at 952-53; see also
Richard A. Cooper & Linda H. Aiken, Human Inputs: The Health Care Workforce and Medical
Markets, 26 J. HEALTH POL. POL'Y & L. 925 (2001).
64 See generally Mark A. Peterson, From Trust to Political Power: Interest Groups, Public Choice,

and Health Care, 26 J. HEALTH POL. POL'Y & L. 1145 (2001).

243

THE ARCHITECTURE OF HEALTH CARE MARKETS

1.

Government Purchasingin Medicare and Medicaid

Initial public involvement in medical markets came in the form
of licensing. Paul Starr details how states acted to legitimize the
claims of allopathic physicians (M.D.s) and solidified these doctors'
positions against their medical and economic rivals. 65 State intervention in an industry creates what Fligstein calls a "policy domain"
governing the state-market interface. 66 Traditionally, the health care
policy domain was dominated by physicians. The domain, however,
was limited primarily to issues of credentialing and defining the
scope of practice of rival groups (e.g., property rights). These areas
correspond to areas of physician expertise. Physician values of autonomy and independence were also very much part of what Fligstein calls the local culture and conceptions of control in medical
markets.
Public-private relations in health care changed dramatically in
1965 with the adoption of the federal Medicare and Medicaid programs. While ushering in substantial change, the initial Medicare
and Medicaid programs were surprisingly conservative in their design, retaining the pre-existing template governing relations in the
field. 67 Even though public funds would now be expended, the government was not to interfere with the professional decision making
authority previously ceded to physicians. 68 Beneficiaries would retain free choice amongst participating providers. Pre-existing economic relations between physicians and hospitals would also be
respected and ratified as Medicare Part A (hospitals) and Part B
65 See

generally PAUL

STARR, THE SOCIAL TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN MEDICINE: THE RISE

OF A SOVEREIGN PROFESSION AND THE MAKING OF A VAST INDUSTRY

(1982).

66FLIGSTEIN, supra note 4, at 39:
I conceive of the modern state as a set of fields that can be defined as policy
domains. Policy domains are arenas of political action where bureaucratic agencies and representatives of firms and workers meet to form and implement policy. The purpose of this policymaking is to make rules and governance
mechanisms to produce stable patterns of interaction in non-state fields. Modem
states also typically develop legal systems with courts that adjudicate and interpret current laws and understandings. These legal fields are domains as well that
contain judges, courts, lawyers, and law schools. One way to understand the

legal system is to realize that legal systems are alternative ways for challenger
groups to engage in political action. By using laws against incumbents, challengers can contest the rights and privileges of dominant groups. Id.
67The preservation of the existing template, even as radical change is introduced, is consistent with the teachings of economic sociology.
68Richard A. Culbertson & Philip R. Lee, Medicareand Physician Autonomy, 18 HEALTH CARE
FIN. REV. 115, 117 (1996).
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(physicians). 69 Even the pre-existing roles of Blue Cross and Blue
Shield would be respected and folded into the new program by contracting out public claims administration to the Blues, acting now as
Medicare carriers and intermediaries. 70 As a result, the private and
professional relations characteristic of 1960s American medical markets would become the defining structural features of publicly financed health care for decades to come, preserved largely to this
71
day.
While preserving the general template of private markets circa
1965, significant changes to the American medical system were
surely to follow. To begin with, the introduction of Medicare and
Medicaid dramatically expanded the number and scope of policy
domains governing state-market relations in health care. While physician licensing was traditionally a state concern, Medicare created
important new policy domains at the federal level. 72 Moreover,
Medicare politically empowered a new group of beneficiary stakeholders (Medicare recipients), whose political clout would prove to
greatly exceed the economic clout they exercised in private preMedicare markets. But beneficiaries were not the only new stakeholders. Fights over Medicare eligibility and authorization at the
federal level became at least as important as older fights over licensing and scope of practice laws at the state level. Through these numerous and incremental decisions, Medicare began to effectively
redefine the scope and composition of modern health care markets. 73 In these new federal battles, physicians proved to be less ca-

69Id. at 115, 116-17, 122; Nancy E. Lew, Overview: 40th Anniversary of Medicare and Medicaid,
27 HEALTH CARE FIN. REV. 5, 7 (2005-2006).
70 Culbertson & Lee, supra note 68, at 115, 116.

71Public and private institutions have different dynamic and evolutionary potentials. Private
markets are likely to be more flexible and responsive to underlying economic forces. The
degree of change in private health care structures and organizations in comparison with
the relatively slow rate of change in Medicare is an interesting illustration of this point.
72Even at the state level, new domains were opened with the Medicaid program. States were
not just passive endorsers of physician operated and controlled certification; they were

now also financiers of health care benefits for Medicaid recipients.
73The contemporary importance of Medicare and Medicaid has been described by David
Hyman as follows: "They influence the nature of competition. They influence the areas in
which competition can exist, and the rules under which it has to exist, and the risks and
rewards, and the institutional framework within which all those things take place." FED.
TRADE COMM'N & DEPT. OF JUST., IMPROVING HEALTH CARE: A DosE OF COMPETITION 227
(2004) (quoting hearing testimony of David A. Hyman) available at: http://www.ftc.gov/
reports/healthcare/040723healthcarerpt.pdf.
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pable of excluding challengers from the table than they had been in
74
traditional state forums.
As an aphorism, I teach students that public controls will inevitably follow public dollars. The reality is more complicated. The
nature of the policy concerns will dictate the nature and content of
the subsequent controls. Medicare and Medicaid debates quickly became preoccupied with controlling costs. Health insurance is associated with strong forms of moral hazard, both static and dynamic.
The root cause of moral hazard is the failure of a decision maker to
internalize all of the costs of her actions. Medicare's original design,
cost-based, fee-for-service compensation with no meaningful checks
on the decision making of providers and consumers was a prescription for static moral hazard, the systematic over-consumption of
health care services. Dynamic moral hazard is a different concern.
Dynamic moral hazard is how Sherry Glied describes the positive
feedback loop medical insurance (public and private) creates for investments in R&D and the accelerated pace of adopting new medical technologies. 75 Both forms of moral hazard contributed to
escalating health care costs and subsequent demands for cost control. One manifestation of the desire to control costs was a public
willingness to renegotiate past public-private divisions of labor defining the state-market interface in health care. In particular, there
was a public willingness to encroach further on principles of physician autonomy. Another manifestation of the desire to control costs
was a willingness to encourage new ways of doing business. Typically, public intervention is in favor of incumbents. When the political agenda is driven by fiscal concerns, however, public actors may
throw their weight behind the efforts of "challengers" to the detriment of market "incumbents." For example, State Medicaid programs began experimenting extensively with various forms of
74Aspects of physician markets and professional networks make doctors particularly powerful at the local and state level. Physicians are everywhere. Physicians are organized
around a wide range of issues, affording economies of organizational scope. Physician
incentives on issues of professional licensing and reimbursement policy are individually
intense and collectively homogenous enough to permit concerted political action. It is difficult for other interest groups to duplicate this on a state-by-state basis or throughout the

thousands of counties in the country. The dynamics of a single, national lobbying effort,
however, are quite different. It is easier for a wider range of interest groups to be players
in Medicare politics. Similarly, the newness of the federal forum and the absence of preexisting networks and relationships made the Medicare playing field more level at its
inception.
75See Sherry A. Glied. Health Insurance and Market Failure Since Arrow, 26 J. HEALTH POL.
POL'Y & L. 957, 961-64 (2001).
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managed care.7 6 More recently, some states have started to experi-

ment with new types of consumer-driven health care.t This public
experimentation is made easier by the fact that physicians as a profession have not demonstrated any particular comparative advantage in the private domain for rationalizing the utilization of care or
controlling costs.
This section is only suggestive of the many ways that Medicare
and Medicaid have had and will continue to have a strong influence
over health care markets. 78 Without question, the policy domains occupied by Medicare and Medicaid have become defining features of
the architecture of medical markets and will play a substantial role
in determining the future shape and direction of market evolution.
2.

Hospitals,Managed Care, and the Changing Structure of the
Firm

The second force eroding traditional physician dominance in
health care is the changing structure of the firm itself. Fligstein
stresses the inherent contestability of the "firm" in any market and
argues that there is an ongoing struggle for internal control. 79 What
exactly constitutes the "firm" in health care is an interesting and
complicated question. Health care is unusual for the degree to
which it has traditionally segregated ownership and control of the
physical capital (hospitals), human capital (physician services), and
financing (insurance) necessary to provide medical services. 8° Ownership and control of the non-profit hospital is another economic
puzzle. Here, groups of otherwise economically independent and
often rivalrous physicians come together to form the "medical staff'
that exercises significant governing authority over the institution, a
facility of which physicians are neither co-owners nor traditional
employees. 81 These structures, however, as unusual as they are,
76See generally Maren D. Anderson & Peter D. Fox, Lessons Learned from Medicaid Managed
Care Experiments, HEALTH AFF., Spring 1987, available at http://content.healthaffairs.org/

cgi/reprint/6/1/71.pdf.
77Sidney D. Watson, Consumer-DirectedMedicaid and Cost Shifting to Patients, 51 ST. Louis U.
L.J. 403, 403 (2007).
78For a more complete discussion of Medicare, see generally Theodore R. Marmor, THE
POLITICS OF MEDICARE

(2d ed. 2000).

79See Economic Fallacy Four, supra Part II.D.
80See Peter J. Hammer, Medical Antitrust Reform: Arrow, Coase and the ChangingStructureof the
Firm, in THE PRIVATIZATION OF HEALTH CARE REFORM (Bloche, G.M., ed.) at 113, 117-21

(2003).
81See generally Clark C. Havighurst, Doctors and Hospitals: An Antitrust Perspective on Traditional Relationships, 1984 DUKE L.J. 1071, 1074 (1984).
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were mainstays of the traditional physician-dominated system of
American health care.
Like other aspects of health care markets, the structure of the
health care firm is changing. Two important trends can be highlighted. The first involves changes in physician-hospital relations.
Driven by changes in technology, the increased specialization of
medical services, and market demands that are becoming more
competitive, hospitals are evolving in a manner to more closely resemble business firms in other sectors. Pragmatically, this means
that they are increasingly organized and operated as unitary, selfinterested economic actors. This has challenged the traditionally
dominant role of physicians. In contrast to the "physician cooperative" model postulated by Pauly and Redisch in the 1970s, 8 2 physi-

cian-hospital relationships are looking more and more like
employer-employee relations, although the exact nature of these relations varies substantially by area of physician specialization.8 3 For
example, many hospitals now hire certain types of physicians as actual employees. Moreover, exclusive contract arrangements for hospital-based practices are now the industry norm. These changes in
physician-hospital relations are taking place at the same time that
hospitals are asserting a broader range of independent economic
objectives.
Many factors are contributing to these changes. Hospitals are
in a better position than individual physicians to pool and manage
many types of risk, ranging from malpractice liability to "at risk"
contracting with managed care providers. As health care services
get more complicated and physician services become more specialized, team production is a more apt metaphor than individual production. Hospitals are in a better position to organize, manage, and
supervise these teams. Whether the logic of the multi-specialty community hospital carries forward into the future is a different question. Specialty hospitals, many owned by physician groups, are
increasingly prominent.14 The problems raised by specialty hospitals, however, are just a reminder of how contestable the underlying
structure of the health care firm remains in response to changes in
technology and reimbursement policy.
82 See generally Mark V. Pauly & Michael A. Redisch, The Not-For-Profit Hospital as a Physi-

cians' Cooperative, 63 AM. ECON. REv. 87 (1973).
83 See generally Peter J. Hammer, How Doctors Became Distributors:A Fabled Story of Vertical
Relations, 14 Loy. CONS. L. REv. 411 (2002).
84 See Peter J. Hammer & William M. Sage, Critical Issues in Hospital Antitrust Law, HEALTH

AFF., Nov.-Dec. 2003, at 88, 93-95.
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The second major trend in restructuring health care firms has
been the closer integration of the financing and delivery of medical
services. Managed care can take many forms and operate under
many guises. The various organizational structures, however, are
largely different attempts to address the moral hazard associated
with traditional fee-for-service compensation. This can be done
through changing financial incentives (capitation or bonuses), better
supervision and monitoring of agents (practice profiling), or rationing access to care (gate-keeping and prior authorizations). While
many experiments have been tried, few dominant sets of organizational form, contracting practices, or financial incentives have
85
emerged.
The internal composition of the firm remains a highly contested issue. Fligstein argues that the "intraorganizational power
struggle is about actors within the organization making claims to
solve the 'critical' organizational problems. 8 6 The critical organizational problem in health care is how to rationalize the utilization of
care at the individual clinical setting in a manner that corresponds
to collective needs and resource constraints. If Fligstein is correct,
"[t]he winners of the internal power struggle are those with a compelling vision of how to make the firm work internally. 8 7 Tellingly,
no such compelling vision has yet emerged in managed care. The
entity that can generate such a workable vision or "conception of
control," whether it be within the tradition of physician professionalism or within the tradition of business entrepreneurship, will
likely inherit the mantle of market leadership (establish a new status
hierarchy). This is not just a business problem, but one that involves
local culture and appropriate cognitive frameworks for interpreting
managed care policies and practices. Functional conceptions of control in medicine will not be workable unless they can also establish a
basis for social trust and afford cultural legitimacy to the new health
care firms.
The ongoing foment underscores the internal contestability of
firm structure and the fact that relations between stakeholders inside (as well as outside) these firms are continually being challenged
and renegotiated. It is fair to ask what role the state plays in this
process. Winning in the policy domain can produce advantages in
the private realm. At the state level, licensing requirements and
85See Hammer, Competition and Quality as Dynamic Processes, supra note 56, at 485-88.
86FLIGSTEIN, supra note 4, at 71.
87Id. at 69.
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scope of practice limits have long served to restrict market competition. Similarly, state corporate practice of medicine laws were historically intended to privilege physicians and to make the practice
of pre-paid medicine (managed care) more difficult. Conversely, the
Federal HMO Act of 1973 was expressly designed to encourage new
types of business structures (in the name of cost containment). Today, actions in the Medicare and Medicaid policy domain have obvious implications for business structure both by encouraging
certain type of businesses by authorizing reimbursement and penalizing other organizational forms in efforts to combat fraud and
abuse. The interaction between these public and private realms and
their implications for firm structure are manifold and complex.
Their significance, however, is often under-appreciated.
More can be said about the historic rise of managed care, the
roles played by federal antitrust law, and ERISA preemption. Physicians have never been shy about using their influence on state legislatures to increase physician authority and to restrict the rise of prepaid medicine (managed care). This anti-managed care agenda was
often pursued under the guise of professional ethics and self-regulation. Clark Havighurst has persuasively detailed how federal antitrust law, starting in the 1970s, played an important role in helping
to transform modem medical markets. 88 The second usage of federal
law that contributed to the rise of managed care was the aggressive
application of ERISA preemption in the 1980s and early 1990s. 89 Antitrust law was consciously applied to limit the ability of physicians
to engage in group boycotts and to employ self-regulation towards
anticompetitive ends. ERISA preemption, perhaps less intentionally,
limited the ability of physicians to seek comparable private objectives through state legislative (public) processes. The combined result was to create an environment more conducive to the
reorganization of the internal structure of the firms providing health
care. Federal law (outside the domain of antitrust state action immunity) effectively trumped state law in areas traditionally buttressing systems of physician dominance. This directly challenged the
controlling position of physicians, further illustrating how developments in distinct policy domains can have significant consequences
in both private markets and other policy domains. That said, it must
also be acknowledged that at the same time these changes were tak88See generally Clark C. Havighurst, Health Care as a (Big) Business: The Antitrust Response, 26
J. HEALTH POL. PoL'Y & L. 939 (2001).
89Timothy S. Hall, Reimagining the Learned Intermediary Rule for the New PharmaceuticalMarketplace, 35 SETON HALL L. REV. 193, 235 n.218 (2004).
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ing place concerns over cost control had already seriously weakened the political influence of physicians, even within their areas of
traditional control.
3.

Labor v. Capital and the Future of Employee Benefits

The final threat to traditional health care structures comes from
the outside. An important theme in Fligstein's book is that in all
developed countries, capital and labor strike grand deals that define
the relative allocations of power and benefits.90 The content of these
deals vary substantially country-by-country and are heavily influenced by the prevailing national politics at the historic moment of
industrialization. Once struck, however, the basic parameters of the
deal are long-lasting. In the United States, the post-World War II
resolution of labor conflict made health care benefits a staple of
union employment. This bargain has been largely respected in subsequent decades. There is much underlying logic to the employerbased system.91 Sufficiently large employee groups provide workable units of insurance, counteracting problems of adverse selection.
Not surprisingly, in light of the teachings of economic sociology,
this deal between capital and labor is not entirely private. Employer-based health care gets substantial public support. Benefits
are not taxed as income. In addition, ERISA affords employers a
great deal of autonomy in defining benefit packages. In the past,
ERISA preemption also protected employer plans from state regulation (and continues to do so for those plans that are self-insured).
Finally, the federal Medicare and Medicaid programs made the
costs of employer-based health care more affordable by removing
two of the more costly tails of the population distribution (the elderly and the disabled) from the purview of private insurance.
Despite these subsidies, however, employers still shouldered a
substantial part of employee health care costs. Internalizing these
costs created predictably strong incentives for employers to control
health care expenditures. Not surprisingly, employers were among
the first groups in the 1970s and 1980s to demand early forms of
utilization review and to experiment with alternative means of financing and delivering care. Today, employer groups like the Leap
Frog Group and the Pacific Business Group on Health remain some
90 See supra notes 30-32 and accompanying text.

91See generally David A. Hyman & Mark Hall, Two Cheers for Employment-Based Health Insurance, 2 YALE J. HEALTH POL'Y L. & ETHics 23 (2001).
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of the most proactive stakeholders seeking ways to control costs and
92
improve the quality of care.
The old capital-labor compromise providing employer-based
health care, however, is being called into question by the forces of
globalization. Associating health benefits with employment necessarily increases the costs of doing business. These costs are manageable if health care costs are relatively low, and if one's primary
competitors have comparable commitments. As American health
care costs rise, and as American producers increasingly compete in
a global economy where their rivals do not pay health care costs as a
part of the cost of doing business, the viability of the old formula is
compromised.
If employers get out of the business of providing traditional
defined benefit plans, there are only a few places responsibility for
the underlying financial risk can go. One can imagine employers
joining the ranks of other groups advocating for a greater public
role in financing health care. This could substantially change the political formula in favor of universal health coverage. As Fligstein
constantly reminds us, however, the overarching template of publicprivate relations has tremendous staying power and is very difficult
to change. 93 Despite the experience of other countries, the American
template is one that strongly resists direct government involvement
in the provision of health care and holds strongly to the illusion of
"private" health care markets.
The second alternative is for the risk currently held by employers to devolve to the individual level. This could be accomplished
through a shift from "defined benefit" to "defined contribution"
plans, coupled with the greater use of various health savings accounts. This result is more consistent with the American template of
public-private relations, meaning that a future of consumer-driven
health care may be a safer bet in the United States than the creation
of new government-funded programs. Ironically, in a devolved
world of consumer-driven health care, individual physicians may
regain some of their traditional stature and influence. However
these issues are resolved, the fate of privately financed care will
have substantial implications for the future architecture of health
care markets, as well as for antitrust law and policy.
92For information about the Leap Frog Group see http://www.leapfroggroup.org (last visited Sept. 20, 2007). For information about the Pacific Business Group on Health see http:/
/www.pbgh.org (last visited Sept. 20, 2007).
93See supra notes 30-37 and accompanying text.
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THE IMPLICATIONS OF ECONOMIC SOCIOLOGY FOR
MEDICAL ANTITRUST LAW AND POLICY

Contemporary medical antitrust law faces three significant
challenges: (1) developing a workable competition policy for health
care; (2) appropriately facilitating adaptive forms of dynamic adjustment; and (3) maintaining workable divisions of labor between public actors and private markets. These are difficult challenges, in part,
because the neoclassical economic model upon which antitrust
courts often rely has little to say about such matters. This section
will introduce each challenge and tentatively examine how our understanding of each might be different in light of the lessons of economic sociology.
A.

Implications for Developing a Competition Policy

A competition policy in health care seeks (1) to better coordinate actions among distinct public actors that affect health care competition and (2) to better negotiate the interface between market and
non-market institutions. Antitrust law is simply one component of a
functional competition policy. The approaches of economic sociology fit comfortably within this discussion. A primary insight of economic sociology is that markets are not independent. Rather,
markets are institutions nested in other social institutions with
strong public participation. 94 If this is the case, then it makes sense
to ask how best to mediate public and private participation and to
coordinate policy across the various domains. In contrast, there is
no need for a competition policy from a neoclassical economic perspective, because the market functions largely independent of the
state.
Fligstein's notion of field theory and policy domains can provide some guidance for constructing a competition policy, but this
will not be a simple process. The first insight is that each incidence
of public-private interface creates its own policy domain. Furthermore, each policy domain is a forum where public and private interests struggle over the creation and preservation of power. The
image that emerges, one of multiple and competing fiefdoms, is
similar to the Balkans of American health care I have described elsewhere. 95 Fligstein reminds us that the public processes in these domains are biased in the sense that they are designed primarily to
94 See

supra notes 9-14 and accompanying text.

95 See Hammer, Competition and Quality as Dynamic Processes, supra note 56, at 475-78.
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respond to and favor the interests of incumbents over challengers. 96
As such, it would be naive to use a simple public interest theory of
government action. Moreover, actions within each policy domain
are likely to be conservative in a different sense. Policy changes will
be reflective of the dominant template governing public-private relations generally, as well as reflective of the local conceptions of
control. This does not mean that more global policy changes are impossible, but it does mean that coordinated changes within this setting will be difficult to achieve. Those agitating for a comprehensive
competition policy need to be more conscious of the obstacles they
will face. This is an important lesson for both lawyers and economists. Economic sociology teaches that the process of social change
is more contested and more political than most economists and lawyers are trained or are inclined to believe.
Politics and conflict exist not only between public and private
spheres, but between and within public spheres. Policy domains exist at the state level in terms of the licensing of physicians (and the
regulation of insurance), at the federal level in terms of Medicare
and ERISA, at a cooperative state-federal level in terms of Medicaid,
and at the federal (as well as the state and purely private) level in
terms of antitrust enforcement. Change is even more complicated
because real reform often entails the reallocation of power, threatening the authority and possibly the continued existence of certain
public domains. Needless to say, public bureaucracies also seek to
reproduce themselves on a period-to-period basis in their own
search for order and stability.
In looking at this maze of overlapping and competing policy
domains, one can identify some particular institutional virtues of
antitrust law as a vehicle for implementing policy change. What are

the advantages of antitrust law and antitrust courts as institutions?
Antitrust courts are relatively less politicized than state legislatures,
self-regulatory forums, and the congressional and regulatory settings where Medicare policy is hammered out. In addition, antitrust
law has its own local "conceptions of control" that are different from
these other forums. The core of contemporary antitrust law embodies the philosophy of neoclassical economics. Its primary focus is on
empowering competitive processes and enabling static efficiency
gains. These values are held and propagated by a broad epistemic
community of judges, lawyers, and academics. Where neoclassical
competition is the appropriatepolicy prescription, these are powerful al96 See

supra notes 21-27 and accompanying text.
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lies in its pursuit. Moreover, the antitrust policy domain is interestingly diffuse, intersecting the health care sector at many different
levels. Where other policy domains are relatively discrete, such as
licensing, antitrust law bisects the health care sector in an entirely
different manner. This gives federal antitrust courts a unique platform from which to work. Finally, antitrust law employs a flexible,
adaptive, common law form of decision making. This is a particular
advantage when the formation and implementation of a competition policy will itself be an incremental process undertaken against
a backdrop of policy uncertainty. By the same token, other institutions and policy domains, such as Medicare and Medicaid, state licensing and self regulation, will have their own roles to play.
Ultimately, defining workable and complementary divisions of labor between these domains lies at the heart of constructing an effective competition policy. In this process, specific attention should be
paid in fostering adaptive efficiency and effectively policing the
public-private boundaries of the state-market interface.
Implications for Cultivating Greater Dynamic Efficiency

B.

Health care markets have undergone substantial changes in the
past forty years, changes that are ongoing. "Change," as a phenomenon, raises difficult questions for both antitrust law and economic
sociology. Economic models of general equilibrium are static models, assuming that technology is held constant. If technology
changes, the economy theoretically moves from one equilibrium to
another, but the model itself has little to say about how these adjustments take place, and even less to say about what the optimal rate
of technological change might be. 97 The challenges to economic sociology are quite different. Markets, from the sociological perspective,
seek stability. Change is often a threat to stability and, therefore, is
something to be avoided. If change is an unavoidable aspect of the
market environment, then actors within this paradigm would seek
stable ways to manage change. The motivation, however, is not the
same as the economic perspective. Change in economic sociology is
managed to produce stability, not in a quest to maximize profits,
nor in some distant belief that the change is leading to some new,
more efficient point of equilibrium.
97

The polar positions staked out in United States v. Microsoft Corp. suggest the ongoing con-

testability in antitrust law regarding issues of dynamic efficiency and technological
change. 147 F.3d 935 (D.C. Cir. 1998).
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If the goal is stability, then health care markets are failing.
Change in health care has often produced greater degrees of instability. Why is this the case? Economic sociology offers a number of
insights about institutional change and evolution. The first insight is
that there is no single right answer. "A sociological approach to
market institutions makes us understand that there is not a single
set of social and political institutions that produces the most efficient allocation of societal resources. 98 There is a wide range of
plausible combinations of market and non-market institutions that
can workably co-exist in a stable order. These different combinations are likely to have different efficiency attributes at their inception, and are also likely to have different capacities to respond and
adjust to change, i.e., different evolutionary potentials.
Institutions must be adaptive to changes in the external and
internal environment. Systems, to encourage adaptive efficiency
seek to exploit (1) consciously designed selection mechanisms and
(2) systems to facilitate learning, feedback, and adaptation. These
concerns are reflected in the sociology literature.
There are two perspectives at work in the sociology of markets.
First, some research suggests that the internal structure is often institutionalized at the founding of the organization. This view implies that an industry converges around a small set of practices
because those firms that survive are selected by the characteristics
of the environment. The opposite point of view agrees that local
environments affect the practices of firms. But, this point of view
suggests that adaptation is possible and that organizations99 make
constant internal adjustments to environmental conditions.

These perspectives are not necessarily in conflict. Ideally, systems of selection and learning can coexist. To the extent that environmental aspects relevant to selection can be manipulated, the
external environment can be shaped to encourage the selection of
desired attributes. To the extent that policy choices, incentives and
subsidies can facilitate learning and feedback, these tools are also
available in the construction of a competition policy.
98FLIGSTEIN, supra note 4, at 23.

99Id. at 14 (citing Michael T. Hannan & John Freeman, The Population Ecology of Organizations, 82 AM. J. Soc. 929 (1977) and Michael T. Hannan & John Freeman, Structural Inertia
and OrganizationalChange, 82 AM. Soc. REV. 149 (1984)). Conscious imitation of successful
practices is a critical part of learning and moving the entire system to better outcomes. Id.
at 18. "If conceptions of control are perceived as successful solutions to the problems of
competition, actors in nearby markets copy them." Id. The same can be said for learning.
"Organizational learning oriented toward reducing uncertainty for firms is an important
process within and across markets." Id. at 18-19.
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Unfortunately, contemporary health care markets have demonstrated little adaptive efficiency, either with respect to section mechanisms encouraging more effective sets of organizational forms and
contracting practices (market processes), 100 or in learning with respect to the selection and propagation of more clinically effective
practices (professional processes). 101 Fligstein's work suggests some
of the obstacles that are confronted. Economic sociology predicts
certain conservative biases to markets responding to change. First,
rather than permitting the factors motivating change to adopt their
own logic and momentum, efforts are often made to force these factors to conform, to the greatest extent possible, with the pre-existing
social template and conceptions of control. This retards the market
capacity for learning and may perpetuate industry misunderstandings about the reasons for recent changes and what such changes
might rationally entail about the future. Second, from Fligstein's
perspective, market actors seek stability not efficiency. As such, incumbent firms are likely to resist the very processes, like competition, that economists would rely upon to act as selection
mechanisms. Finally, incumbents have allies within political structures. Changes within policy domains are more likely to be designed to protect incumbent interests and minimize the adverse
effects of change than to facilitate the effective dissemination and
adoption of new best practices.
These lessons serve as an important reality check. Adopting
more dynamically efficient policies is like swimming upstream. Policy makers and market actors must not only be able to think outside
the box (or the parameters of existing conceptions of control), but
they must also employ strategies capable of overcoming predictable
obstacles in both political and economic realms. All things considered, it is not surprising that most radical policy changes take place
at times of crisis or revolution.
Building a normative case for dynamic efficiency is much easier from an economic than a sociological perspective. Innovation,
whether in terms of technology or organizational structure (the
composition of the firm), lowers the cost of production, increases
profits, and triggers a global reallocation of resources through the
price mechanism that moves the entire economy to new equilibrium, generating higher levels of social welfare. In this world, antitrust law can be applied to encourage competition, prevent
100See generdly Hammer, supra note 56, at 485-88.
101See id. at 481-85.
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collusion, and assist in the dynamic adjustment process. Antitrust
law could play an analogous role in economic sociology. Markets
and policy domains in economic sociology strive for stability, not
efficiency. Conceptions of control protect incumbents to the systematic disadvantage of challengers. One might envision a role of antitrust law that is designed to introduce greater competition (a source
of instability) than incumbents would otherwise permit, thereby
providing an additional tool to empower challengers in their struggles. But there is a rub. Once we depart from the economic paradigm, there is no guarantee that greater competition is necessarily
desirable. Why not favor the pursuit of stability over the pursuit of
efficiency, especially if efficiency is not thought to be attainable? In
this world, the normative case for competition and antitrust law
must be confronted directly.
Health care provides the basis for an interesting thought experiment. In medical markets, antitrust law was consciously applied to
breakup a pre-existing, professionally dominant order that likely
did systematically favor stability over efficiency.10 2 Aggressive application of antitrust principles helped usher in substantial economic and organizational change (favoring challengers over
incumbent physicians) that otherwise would not have taken place,
or would have taken place at a slower rate and in a different institutional form.10 3 A harder question, looking back, is whether we are
better off as a result. This question really serves to highlight the indeterminacy of institutional forms and the inability to guarantee
that any constellation of market and non-market institutions will
necessarily generate the desired policy objectives.
The counterfactual is worth pursuing. While hostile to price
competition, advertising, and all forms of pre-paid medicine, professional domination did afford health care a relatively stable infrastructure. The last twenty-five years have witnessed substantial
change, but few stable and sustainable solutions. Tellingly, a contemporary reassertion of professional dominance would likely have
greater cultural resonance than the continued marketization of
health care. Physician control is still more consistent with traditional
power structures and conceptions of control. By the same token, the
social payoff to greater professional control and less competition is
not clear. The old regime demonstrated that professional dominance
102See Havighurst, supra note 94.

103Antitrust did not act alone. As discussed, supra notes 92-93, it was aided by ERISA preemption and a broader skepticism of dominant physician conceptions of control, given
their inability to control health care costs.
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coupled with public finance and fee-for-service compensation was
unsustainable. Similarly, John Wennberg's The Dartmouth Atlas of
Health Care documenting the small area clinical variations 0 4 and
growing literature on patient safety, 0 5 raises serious reservations
about the underlying efficacy and adaptive potential of professional
systems. The Wennberg variations show relatively weak professional selection mechanisms. The patient safety problems show limited systemic potential for professional learning, adaptation, and the
dissemination of best practices.
Counterfactuals aside, the real question is "where do we go
now that we are here, given where we came from?" The central policy concern today remains cost control. There are two potentially
distinct mechanisms available to rationalize costs: (1) reliance on
10 6
market forces or (2) reliance on systems of physician deference.
Market processes rely on "firm entrepreneurship," the hope that innovative new business organizations, contracting practices, and financial incentives will emerge to better ration care through
decentralized competition. Professional processes appeal to physician expertise to rationalize care and control costs at the individual
level. Personally, I have greater faith in the ability of market
processes to find solutions to our current problems than professional processes. Part of this faith is based on the strength of private
incentives, but part is based on certain demonstrated weaknesses of
traditional physician conceptions of control. The core of physician
expertise, traditionally defined, is medical/scientific - the ability to
select the best treatment option available, self-consciously without
regard to cost or ability to pay. The appeal to science and the eschewing of financial considerations were both important aspects of
the social legitimacy of the medical profession. As such, decisions
about how to ration care subject to a budget constraint are both

104See generally CTR. FOR THE EVALUATIVE CLINICAL Sci., THE DARTMOUTH ATLAS OF HEALTH
CARE

1999, THE

QUALITY OF MEDICAL CARE IN THE UNITED STATES: A REPORT ON TEE MEDI-

CARE PROGRAM (1999).
105See, e.g., INST. OF MED. OF THE NAT'L ACAD., To ERR IS HUMAN: BUILDING A SAFER HEALTH

SYSTEM (1999).

106A third option would be cost controls through state-administrative means. I give short
attention to state solutions given their disfavor in the American tradition. It should be
noted, however, that existing Medicare and Medicaid policies, in particular coverage and

authorization decisions, are already acting as de facto administrative-bureaucratic instruments for rationalizing costs, including technology. If one wanted to use formal state
mechanisms, there are no doubt better ways to accomplish these tasks than Medicare's
current ad hoc administration.
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outside the domain of physicians' traditional expertise and a threat
to their perceived legitimacy.
Now comes the market. Allocating scarce resources in response to diverse consumer preferences is a core competence of
well-functioning markets. Moreover, as long as cost control is
thought of as an abstract goal, the appeal to market solutions has a
certain cultural resonance. But though the market has competence,
it lacks legitimacy. The market rhetoric for rationing falls flat when
applied at the level of the individual clinical encounter. Markets
may be able to achieve greater efficiency, but they cannot provide
legitimacy in health care. Professionalism, in contrast, is unlikely to
generate efficiency, but is a potential source of social legitimacy.
This is the central paradox of contemporary health care markets. Fligstein's work may suggest how it can be unraveled. No stable market solution will be reached in health care without new
conceptions of control governing how the business of medicine can
legitimately be conducted in a cost-conscious environment. A modified role of professionalism may be unavoidable in constructing
such conceptions of control by affording market solutions social legitimacy. Unfortunately, physicians have been slow to respond to
this challenge, while the business structures spawned by the managed care revolution have afforded no real substitute for the individual in the white coat as the cultural repository of patient trust.
Any workable competition policy in health care will have to infuse
market processes with greater levels of trust and legitimacy, the
source of which will likely be rooted in professional rather than economic traditions.
C.

Implications for the Antitrust State Action Doctrine

State action immunity is an odd appendage to the rest of antitrust law. 10 7 The doctrine sits at the public-private interface of statemarket relations. The legal rules in this antitrust domain have a
strong binary flavor. If the conduct is "private," it is governed by the
same antitrust standards as all other private conduct, with no concessional nuance for its public or quasi-public nature. If the conduct
is "public," it is completely removed from the antitrust domain and
subject to no further scrutiny. As such, if the conduct is of the state
government itself, it is clearly immune. The harder case of private
conduct undertaken pursuant to state mandate requires further
107 See generally HERBERT HOVENKAMP, FEDERAL ANTITRUST POLICY: THE LAW OF COMPETITION
AND ITS PRACTICE

(2d Ed.) 721-45 (1999).
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proof of (1) a "clearly articulated and affirmatively expressed state
policy" to displace competition with regulation and (2) active state
supervision 0 8 Once the private conduct is sufficiently tinged by the
public hand, however, it also enjoys the same complete immunity as
the state itself.
Two complementary rationales explain this binary tendency.
In the neoclassical model of general competitive equilibrium, there
is no role for the state. The economic model lacks a theory of public
action. In the absence of a theory of state-market relations, public
action in the antitrust domain is viewed as a rare occurrence subject
to completely different norms and standards than market conduct.
The second rationale has more serious implications for efforts to
construct and maintain a competition policy. Antitrust law is ultimately constrained by the courts themselves as an institution. Not
surprisingly then, the antitrust rules toggling between "public" and
"private" conduct also map onto an institutional division of labor
between the legislative and judicial branches, as well as principles
of federalism. Under this view, antitrust law, best viewed as a congressionally authorized body of federal common law, must yield to
express legislative determinations and processes. As a result, if it is
"private," then antitrust law controls. If it is "public," then antitrust
law (and private markets) yields to legislative determinations. 01 9
One of the principal lessons of economic sociology, however, is
that there is no clear distinction between public and private when it
comes to economic markets. 10 The public and the private are intimately intertwined and often must be treated as one package. If this
is true, then existing antitrust doctrine is seriously misguided. If
competition is to be encouraged, it is not sufficient for antitrust law
to police private power in private markets. If incumbents can exercise private power in economic markets to their competitive advantage, they are likely able to exercise comparable power in the public
arena as well. Policing one and not the other is inconsistent and
likely to be ineffectual as a matter of policy and practice. Antitrust
errors are two-fold. The first type we have just discussed, anticompetitive conduct that should be condemned can be saved by giving
108Cal. Retail Liquor Dealers Ass'n v. Midcal Aluminum, Inc., 445 U.S. 97, 105-06 (1980).
109This paragraph is a little misleading. The deference afforded state legislative processes is
ultimately a deference born of federalism. Parker v. Brown, 371 U.S. 341 (1943). For expositional purposes, however, it is easier to focus on the contrast between "public" and "private", and "judicial" and "legislative" processes without differentiating between federal
and state action on the public side.
110See supra notes 9-14 and accompanying text.
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it a sufficiently public cloak. Errors, however, can run in the other
direction as well. Existing antitrust law too readily condemns nonmarket institutions sponsored by private actors that may serve legitimate public purposes. Recognizing this, I have argued elsewhere
that antitrust law should be more willing to consider the welfareenhancing potential of such combinations.1 11
Again, health care illustrates these many possibilities. Antitrust
law would clearly condemn as a restraint on trade a prohibition on
public bidding by members of a professional organization'1 2 or the
refusal of dentists to share x-rays that would facilitate insurance
utilization review, 11 3 if those actions were carried out under the "private" auspices of professional ethics and self-regulation. The same
conduct, however, would receive complete immunity from antitrust
scrutiny if it was mandated by the state, or if the state was to authorize a self-regulatory body to make such policy and the state sufficiently supervised that body's conduct. Substantively, the cases
are more alike than different. If competition is expected to yield
public benefits, then trade is being restrained in all cases. On the
basis of economic policy, it is difficult to distinguish between them.
One might claim, however, that important procedural differences provide a basis for distinction. The presence of a deliberative
legislative process and/or active supervision by the state itself
might provide some substantive assurance that the later cases were
unlikely to restrain trade, or that such a restraint would be to the
public benefit. This is only persuasive if one can put forward and
defend an appropriate public interest theory of public action. This is
not necessarily, and often not likely the case, especially in the presence of concentrated producer interests. Again, economic sociology
teaches that the state is most likely to intervene at the behest of, and
in furtherance of, the interest of incumbent groups. If this is true,
then the "public" and "private" cases are likely to have the same
adverse impact on social welfare, whether imposed directly by incumbents or under the auspices of state processes.
John Wiley made a similar point some two decades ago.1 4 No
coherent theory of state action can be outlined without expressly
identifying a theory of government action. The absence of a theory
111See generally Peter J. Hammer, Antitrust Beyond Competition: Market Failures, Total Welfare,

and the Challenge of Intramarket Second-Best Tradeoffs, 98 MICH. L. REV. 849 (2000).
112See generally Nat'l Soc'y of Prof'l Eng'r v. United States, 435 U.S. 679 (1978).

113See generally Fed. Trade Comm'n v. Ind. Fed'n of Dentists, 476 U.S. 447 (1986).
114See generally John S. Wiley, Jr., A Capture Theory of Antitrust Federalism, 99 HARV. L. REV.
713 (1986).
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of the state in economic models of competition and, so far, the unwillingness of antitrust law to assert its own theory of public-private
relations at the state-market interface has produced the present noman's land policed by the state action doctrine. To begin to breathe
substantive life into the doctrine, one must start with the premise
that there really is a "there" there. Markets do not exist independent
of the state. While there are some sectors where state involvement is
so minimal that it may safely be ignored, the same is not true for
health care. Public-private relations at the state-market interface are
critical to the existence and functioning of health care markets.
Moreover, power is routinely exercised by the same actors in both
realms and it flows across a porous border.
The primary point of a competition policy is to help define and
mediate relations at this contested public-private border. Some of
this reform can take place within the existing antitrust paradigm
and under existing doctrine. Some parts can be accomplished by encouraging the organic development and extension of antitrust doctrine in new directions. Given limits of existing doctrine and the
current antitrust mandate, some aspects of competition policy must
be legislatively enacted to give courts, antitrust or otherwise, greater
powers to police the competitive implications of public conduct. Finally, it may be appropriate to take some of the responsibility antitrust courts have for policing competition and reallocate it to other
public (and possibly private) actors. The bottom line is that the existing template governing public-private relations, as defined by the
state action doctrine, is inadequate to police the state-market boundary in those sectors where public-private relations are interconnected in complex ways. At such interfaces, a sector-specific
competition policy is required. Once constructed, the competition
policy would necessarily re-define and possibly even obviate the
need for the existing state action doctrine.
The state action doctrine continues to spawn controversy in
health care. Clark Havighurst and William Brewbaker take opposing views on the topic in a recent special issue of the Journal of
Health Policy, Politics and Law dedicated to the Joint DOJ-FTC Report "Improving Health Care: A Dose of Competition. '115 Havighurst argues that the courts have grown lax in enforcing the existing
standards for state action immunity. He calls for stricter interpreta15 See generally Clark C. Havighurst, Contesting Anticompetitive Actions Taken in the Name of the
State: State Action Immunity and Health Care Markets, 31 J. HEALTH POL. POL'Y & L. 587
(2006); William S.Brewbaker, Learning to Love the State Action Doctrine, 31 J. HEALTH POL.
PO'Y & L. 610 (2006).

THE ARCHITECTURE OF HEALTH CARE MARKETS

263

tion of the "clear articulation" and "active supervision" prongs of
the Midcal test, especially as applied to state-sponsored licensing
boards. 116 His underlying concern is legitimate. As previously discussed, it is all too easy to disguise private anticompetitive restraints as "state action" and invoke immunity under existing
doctrine. In lieu of a new competition policy, I agree with Havighurst that courts should strictly apply the Midcal test and subject
quasi-public action in this area to greater antitrust scrutiny. Havighurst and I, however, differ on the type of antitrust scrutiny that is
appropriate. I favor review under the auspices of a total welfare criteria and not one defined by the conduct's "pro-competitive" conformity with formalistic models of competition.11 7 As part of a new
competition policy, Bill Sage and I have proposed going even further and subjecting certain conduct of the state itself to antitrust
11 8
scrutiny, under the same total welfare standard.
Brewbaker takes a different tact. Brewbaker highlights the implicit channeling function played by the state action doctrine. The
state action doctrine channels certain categories of disputes to the
judiciary to be evaluated under existing antitrust standards. It
channels other types of disputes to a legislative forum to be considered under legislative standards and processes. Brewbaker correctly
argues that channeling determinations have to be made in light of
perceived comparative institutional advantages. Based upon what
he perceives as inherent limitations in judicial decision making capacity, he comes down largely on the side of how current channeling is taking place, removing most publicly tinged conduct from
judicial antitrust review.1 19
While I agree with Brewbaker's frame, we hold different premises about the underlying comparative institutional advantages and,
therefore, come to different conclusions about how the channeling
function should take place. I am guilty of being an antitrust optimist. I am optimistic about the ability of courts to handle complex
economic questions. 120 While I acknowledge that existing doctrine is
inadequately prepared to handle some of the issues raised in the
area of hybrid public-private institutions, I have argued for an or116Havighurst, supra note 88, at 596-600.
117William M. Sage & Peter J. Hammer, A Copernican View of Health Care Antitrust, 65 LAW &
CONTEMP. PROBS. 241, 265-67 (2002).
118Id. at 278-80. Such an outcome would obviously require new legislative authorization, and
could not take place under existing antitrust doctrine.
119Brewbaker, supra note 115, at 618-20.
120Hammer, Antitrust Beyond Competition, supra note 111, at 895-900.
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ganic reformation of doctrines to better address these questions
under a total welfare standard that can expressly value the welfareenhancing potential of non-market institutions. 121 Finally, I am optimistic about the institutional advantages of the common law process of decision-making and its adaptive potential. Especially under
conditions of uncertainty and in light of a constantly evolving backdrop, a common law system of decision making applying appropriately defined standards is likely to produce better outcomes at the
state-market interface than will state legislative decision-making.
On this last point, I am more pessimistic than Brewbaker. I do not
believe that state legislatures, operating in their own narrow policy
domains and under the strong influence of physicians, will necessarily make the best health policy decisions.
V.

CONCLUSIONS

In some policy domains, the absence of a theory of markets
does not seriously hinder the economic and legal analysis. Public
involvement in these areas can legitimately be considered a second
order concern. In a sector like health care, however, where public
involvement is central, the absence of a theory of state-market relations is a serious handicap. Neoclassical economics provides little
guidance. Economic sociology can begin to fill this void. A model is
helpful if it provides a useful framework for thinking about
problems that leads to new understandings and new lines of inquiry. Fligstein's architecture of markets does both. By introducing
these ideas to a broader audience of antitrust and health care lawyers and academics, and by making some tentative suggestions
about how economic sociology might be applied to health care, I
hope others will be inspired to think harder about the composition
and dynamics of health care markets. Economic sociology and Fligstein's architecture can provide a useful foundation and set of tools
from which to work.

121Id.

at 921-25.

